After Grant's Landing and Before the Siege of Vicksburg

This paqe is about the Battle of Vicksburg (where all references live) during the American Civil War. This material is on early military actions before the actual siege of Vicksburg took place, including the burning of Jackson, Mississippi and the Battle of Champion Hill.

Table of contents

1 The big gamble begins 2 First blood 3 Before the drive on Jackson; on the Union supply problem 4 The controversial solution of the Union supply problem 5 Confederate confusion 6 The destruction of Jackson 7 Confederate confusion before the Battle of Champion Hill; Union intelligence 8 The Battle of Champion Hill 9 After Champion Hill

The big gamble begins

On April 31, 1863, as Sherman attacked Haines Bluff, as Grierson was confusing the Confederates throughout the region, Grant completed his landed of about 23,000 troops at Bruinsburg. The great gamble was soon to begin, but Grant felt himself past the worst. He was on the east side of the river facing the enemy. In his Personal Memoirs, ch. 33, Grant observes,

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since.

So far, Pemberton had done an effective job, and was highly regarded in the Confederacy, despite his northern birth. Grant's seven earlier flops had left Vicksburg untouched. Now the past 24 hours saw blue troops under Grierson to the east, under Grant to the south, and under Sherman to the north, all up to no good. Pemberton was absolutely befuddled, and by the time he realized that the real poison flowed from Bruinsburg, it was too late. Grant had his whole army ashore.

Pemberton's high regard in the Confederacy was soon to change. The gambler who in Spring 1864 became the highest officer in the entire Union army was opposing him with an army of twenty-three thousand. In the vicinity of Jackson, Mississippi was Confederate general Joe Johnston with an army of about 30,000, some untrained.

First blood

For a time, Pemberton thought Grant was abandoning the whole operation and withdrawing to Memphis, but he soon realized he was wrong (see Foote, Fredericksburg to Meridian, pg. 345), and bllod was soon spilled.

Grant soon met opposition from Confederate Brigadier General John S. Bowen. On April 30 -- May 1, 5,500 rebel troops (Bruce Catton says 8,000) met Grant's forces under the over-ambitious General McClernand, east of Bruinsburg at Port Gibson, on ground Grant in his Personal Memoirs (ch. 33 ) described as

... makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one.

Bowen hoped to bog Grant down until reinforced, which he was, to about 9,000 -- not enough.

Considering the disparity in numbers, the rebels put up an amazing defense, which Grant described somewhere (didn't find it in his Personal Memoirs, but Foote mentions it) as "... very bold ... and well carried out," but the rebel position was hopeless. Shortly the Union held the field; they were later reinforced by Sherman to a total of 40,000. The rebels fell north behind the Big Black River, abandoning their fortifications at Grand Gulf exactly as Grant expected.

Before the drive on Jackson; on the Union supply problem

Pemberton now knew that Grant's entire army was across the river, and thought it would make sense to drive straight at Vicksburg, but Grant was too foxy. Joe Johnston's army at Jackson and could attack on the Union rear. Grant moved quickly. "Every day's delay is worth 2,000 men to the enemy," he had said. In early May, a load of Union stores had just been lost to Vicksburg's now-more-accurate batteries on a moonlit night.

The Confederates had to move quickly too. Orders went out for the state archives to be moved from Jackson; all guns and munitions possible were sent to Vicksburg for a last-ditch defense. The Confederates expected that Grant, soon to be cut off from a tenuous supply line, would be defeated by a combined attack of rebel troops from throughout the Confederacy. "I am a Northern man; I know my people," Pemberton observed. He seemed to not know Grant and Sherman.

The controversial solution of the Union supply problem

Sherman protested Grant's order for his troops to come downriver. The road from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times was so poor that they couldn't hope to supply their huge army over it. Grant had other ideas about supply than the bad road -- very different ideas indeed. Sherman's forces duly arrived on May 7.

In a move that presaged Sherman's controversial post- Atlanta campaign of "scorched earth (see also Total war), Grant cut loose from his supplies to live off the land. As Yankee soldiers lived high, little in his path survived as he drove for not Vicksburg, but Jackson, connected by rail to Vicksburg and the rest of the Confederacy. All plantations were stripped bare, a Draconian policy that later led to many questions about Union conduct -- civilians lacked food, but Grant's approximately 45,000 troops didn't; many Southern farmers were left with nothing.

Confederate confusion

Grant's rapid movements caught the Confederates off guard. Johnston wanted Pemberton's troops, but Pemberton, unwilling to leave Vicksburg undefended, demurred. The rest of the Confederacy was in a state of alarm by now, building a force to help Johnston defend Pemberton.

Re-inforced by Sherman, Grant had 40,000 troops, but his heavyweight force jabbed and ducked like a lightweight fighter. Pemberton only knew he was being hit from many directions at once. Low on cavalry, he had no idea of Grant's plans. He had to defend the Big Black lest Grant attack Vicksburg from there; he had to defend the railroad; he had to defend his north, as he expected Union troops to come down from Tennessee. Johnston wanted him to strike Grant, even if he abandoned Vicksburg, but Confederate President Jefferson Davis ordered the holding of Vicksburg at all costs.

McClernand had driven for the city of Bolton, close by a 70-foot prominence called Champion Hill, on the railway midway between Vicksburg and Jackson, McClernand now in the army's rear, to be its front after the reduction of Jackson. McClernand was to hold Pemberton back while Grant and Sherman reduced Jackson to ashes.

The destruction of Jackson

On May 14, Sherman and General McPherson had already attacked Jackson and were burning the city -- the first of three times the city burned during the war. It tellingly gained the nickname Chimneyville. The home-state capital of Confederate President Davis was in Union hands. All Johnston managed was a delaying action, retreating north.

Not six months before, Davis had predicted they would "meet and hurl back these worse than vandal hordes." The "vandal hordes" were at Davis's old doorstep, and were behaving like Vandals in the Roman days. The Stars and Stripes flew over the statehouse.

Some of the destruction was enacted by poorer residents of the city (many rich had gotten out), white and black, eager to make off with anything they could steal. The prison had been emptied, and was promptly on fire with much of the rest of the town; despite many pleas from townspeople, Grant did not consider it his job to protect the property of those who had rebelled against the Union, before or after the war. In his Personal Memoirs, Grant tells a revealing story (ch. 35):

Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked on for awhile to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "C.S.A" woven into each bolt. There was an immense amount of cotton in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes the cotton and the factory were a blaze. The proprieter visited Washington while I was President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by the National troops, so he might use it with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. I declined.

C.S.A means Confederate States of America.

All railroads and all that aided the military of the Confederacy were destroyed. Grant slept in a bed on which presumably Joe Johnston had slept the night before, though shortly prior to Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Grant slept in a bed in which the manager lied to him of Lee's having slept in the night before.

Confederate confusion before the Battle of Champion Hill; Union intelligence

Pemberton's had to move fast and attack, ultimately leaving a force of about 9,000 to protect the front of Vicksburg, a force so small that if any large group of Union troops bumbled in that direction, Vicksburg might be doomed. West of Grant was McClernand's force at Raymond, advancing north on Bolton, a few miles from Champion Hill; McPherson's troops defeated a rebel force two miles from Raymond.

Pemberton was befuddled. He couldn't lose Vicksburg by marching away from it, but Johnston wanted to meet him at Clinton and his army for a decisive blow on the Union close by Jackson. Pemberton preferred to wait in a fortified position behind the Big Black River, drive back the Yankees from their expected attack against Vicksburg, then annihilate them. Three conflicting plans swam in his head; trying to reconcile them led to disaster.

Pemberton marched southeast to Dillon to cut Grant's now-nonexistent supply line, after which he would be forced to either fight on a field of Pemberton's choice, or withdraw. Johnston expected Grant to remain in Jackson, giving him time to unite with Pemberton. Pemberton abandoned his Dillon expedition to march on Clinton, Johnston's original plan.

A Confederate turncoat had kept Grant supplied with the notes running between Pemberton and Johnston. Shortly McPherson was marching from Jackson to Bolton to meet the unlucky Pemberton. Other Confederate turncoats informed Grant of Pemberton's movements, overestimating Pemberton's army's size. Even though Grant had 10,000 more on hand than this overestimate, Grant still strengened his army at Bolton by more of Sherman's men, knowing full well that "God is on the side of the biggest battalions."

The Battle of Champion Hill

Champion Hill, May 16. Champion Hill was a big, decisive battle, and will only be here summarized. Shelby Foote quotes least one western-thinking historian having called it "the most decisive battle of the Civil War." The hill runs roughly from north-northeast to south-southwest and is more of a long thin plateau.

Grant observed in his Personal Memoirs (ch. 35),

... where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in the range.

McClernand found itself facing a solidly-held Champion Hill, a ridge teaming with graybacks. This 70-foot prominence had great defensive strength. Other times in the Civil War -- Malvern Hill during the Seven Days Campaign , the soon-to-happen Battle of Gettysburg, Marye's Heights at the Battle of Fredericksburg, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, attempts to take well-entrenched hills had led to disaster for the attacking army, even when the defenders were outnumbered.

So in reverse of Gettysburg, the Confederates had taken the high ground first, but the results were different. There were roughly 20,000 rebels under generals (north to south on the hill) Stevenson, Bowen, and Loring facing 29,000 Federals under (north to south, east of the hill) McPherson and McClernand. Grant shortly reached the front, and as at the Battle of Belmont, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh, he kept his cool.

McClernand, true to his nature that Grant so hated, had been less than aggressive in the south, and Pemberton had correspondingly shifted his weight to the north. The "scared turkey" Loring was cut off in the south, protesting that he couldn't move north and abandon his position. McPherson was pressing harder and harder in the north against Stevenson, and at about 4:00, the entire north end of the Confederate line collapsed. The Confederates managed to escape with most of their now-disorganized army, but the damage was done. Loring's whole division lost contact with what remained of their army, circling Grant and bumbling into Johnston.

Rebel fighting spirit had been pulverized at a loss of 3,624 (Catton says 3,800) troops, and Loring's entire division. Grant lost 2,441 troops and gained the initiative.

Grant of course sniped at the lack of fighting spirit of his enemy McClernand, peeved that he hadn't killed or captured Pemberton's entire force so as to unstoppably march into Vickburg; McClernand's casualties were low to nonexistent in the far south, but McPherson's troops paid dearly in blood.

The politically ambitious McClernand, who knew the path to the White House passed through Vickburg, -- it did, but for Grant, not McClernand -- managed to take main credit for the victory. Pemberton's army fell back to a defensive position at the Big Black River in front of Vicksburg.

It was a bloody, if decisive, Union victory. In his Personal Memoirs," (ch. 35) Grant observed,

While a battle if raging, one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to alleviate the sufferings of an enemy as a friend.

After Champion Hill

After the battle, Union soldier Wilbur Crummer of the 45th Illinois Infantry walked the field, noting,

There they lay, the blue and the gray intermingled; the same rich, young American blood flowing out in little rivulets of crimson; each thinking he was in the right.

Several months later, Union troops passing by part of the battlefield noted four-foot high corn in rank rows, as if nothing had happened there.

The path to Vicksburg was open, and much more blood would flow.