This article is part of theHistory of Afghanistan series. |
Pre-Islamic period of Afghanistan |
Islamic conquest of Afghanistan |
Durrani Empire |
European influence in Afghanistan |
Reforms of Amanullah Khan and civil war |
Reigns of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah |
Daoud's Republic of Afghanistan |
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan |
History of Afghanistan since 1992 |
The welcome Mohammed Daoud Khan received on returning to power on
July 17, 1973 reflected the citizenry's disappointment with the
lackluster politics of the preceding decade. Zahir Shah's "New Democracy" had promised much but had delivered little. Daoud's comeback was a return to traditional strongman rule and he was a particularly appealing figure to military officers. As prime minister, Daoud had obtained large supplies of modern arms from the Soviet Union and he had been a former army officer himself. Also, his strong position on the Pashtunistan issue had not been forgotten by conservative Pashtun officers.
Daoud discussed rebellion for more than a year with various opposition elements--both moderates and leftists, including military officers who were members of both the Khalqi and
Parchami factions of the PDPA. Certainly the communists had
worked vigorously to undermine Zahir Shah's experiment in
constitutional democracy. Their inflammatory speeches in
parliament and organized street riots were tactics which alarmed
the king to the degree that he refused to sign the law legalizing
political parties. Babrak Karmal's Parcham faction became integrally
involved in planning the coup. There is general agreement that
Daoud had been meeting with what he called various "friends" for
more than a year. The coup itself was carried out by junior
officers trained in the Soviet Union. Some Afghans suspected that
Daoud and Karmal had been in touch for many years and that Daoud
had used him as an informant on the leftist movement. No strong
link can be cited to support this, however, other than the
closeness between Karmal's father, an army general, and Daoud. At
the time of the July 1973 coup, which took place when the king
was in Italy receiving eye treatment at the medicinal mud baths
at Ischia, it was sometimes difficult to assess the
factional and party affiliation of the officers who took place.
Despite a number of conversions of Parchamis to the Khalqi
faction by the time of the communist coup of April 1978 which
overthrew Daoud, both party and factional loyalties became
obvious after the PDPA took power.
Although leftists had played a central role in the coup, and
despite the appointment of two leftists as ministers, evidence
suggests that the coup was Daoud's alone. Officers personally
loyal to him were placed in key positions while young Parchamis
were sent to the provinces, probably to get them out of Kabul,
until Daoud had purged the leftist officers by the end of 1975.
The next year, Daoud established his own political party, the
National Revolutionary Party, which became the focus of all
political activity. In January 1977, a loya jirga approved
Daoud's constitution establishing a presidential, one party
system of government.
Any resistance to the new regime was suppressed. A coup attempt by Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, which may have been planned before Daoud took power, was subdued shortly after his coup. In October 1973, Maiwandwal, a former prime minister and a highly respected former diplomat, died in prison at a time when Parchamis controlled the Ministry of Interior under circumstances corroborating the widespread belief that he had been tortured to death.
While both of the PDPA's factions had attempted to collaborate
with Daoud before the 1973 coup, Parcham used its advantage to
recruit on an unprecedented scale immediately following the coup.
Daoud, however, soon made it clear that he was no front man and
that he had not adopted the claims of any ideological faction. He
began in the first months of his regime to ease Parcharmis out of
his cabinet. Perhaps not to alienate the Soviet Union, Daoud was
careful to cite inefficiency and not ideological reasons for the
dismissals. Khalq, seeing an opportunity to make some short-term
gains at Parcham's expense, suggested to Daoud that "honest"
Khalqis replace corrupt Parchamis. Daoud, wary of ideologues,
ignored this offer.
Daoud's ties with the Soviet Union, like his relations with
Afghan communists, deteriorated during his five year presidency.
This loosening of ties with the Soviet Union was gradual. Daoud's
shift to the right and realignment made the Soviets anxious but
western observers noted that Daoud remained solicitous of Soviet
interests and Afghanistan's representative in the United Nations
voted regularly with the Soviet Bloc or with the group of
nonaligned countries. The Soviets remained by far Afghanistan's
largest aid donor and were influential enough to insist that no
Western activity, economic or otherwise, be permitted in northern
Afghanistan.
Daoud still favored a state-centered economy, and, three years
after coming to power, he drew up an ambitious seven-year
economic plan (1976 - 1983) that included major projects and required
a substantial influx of foreign aid. As early as 1974, Daoud
began distancing himself from over-reliance on the Soviet Union
for military and economic support. That same year, he formed a
military training program with India, and opened talks with Iran
on economic development aid. Daoud also turned to other oil-rich
Muslim nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, for
financial assistance.
Pashtunistan zealots confidently expected the new president to
raise this issue with Pakistan, and in the first few months of
the new regime, bilateral relations were poor. Efforts by Iran
and the United States to cool a tense situation succeeded after a
time, and by 1977 relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had
notably improved. During Daoud's March 1978 visit to Islamabad,
an agreement was reached whereby President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq of
Pakistan released Pashtun and Baloch militants from prison in
exchange for Daoud withdrawing support for these groups and
expelling Pashtun and Baloch militants taking refuge in
Afghanistan.
Daoud's initial visit to the Soviet Union in 1974 was
friendly, despite disagreement on the Pashtunistan issue. By the
time of Daoud's second visit in April 1977, the Soviets knew of
his purge of the left begun in 1975, his removal of Soviet
advisers from some Afghan military units, and his changes in
military training whereby other nations, especially India and
Egypt, trained Afghans with Soviet weapons. Despite official
goodwill, unofficial reports circulated of sharp Soviet criticism
of anticommunists in Daoud's new cabinet, of his failure to
cooperate with the PDPA, and of his criticism of Cuba's role in
the non-aligned movement. Furthermore, Daoud was friendly with
Iran and Saudi Arabia, and he had scheduled a visit to Washington
for the spring of 1978.
By 1978 Daoud had achieved little of what he had set out to
accomplish. Despite good harvests in 1973 and subsequent years,
no real economic progress had been made, and the Afghan standard
of living had not improved. By the spring of 1978, he had
alienated most key political groups by gathering power into his
own hands and refusing to tolerate dissent. Although Muslim
fundamentalists had been the object of repression as early as 1974, their numbers had nonetheless increased. Diehard
Pashtunistan supporters were disillusioned with Daoud's
rapprochement with Pakistan, especially by what they regarded as
his commitment in the 1977 agreement not to aid Pashtun militants
in Pakistan.
Most ominous for Daoud were developments among Afghan
communists. In March 1977, despite reaching a fragile agreement
on reunification, Parcham and Khalq remained mutually suspicious.
The military arms of each faction were not coordinated because,
by this time, Khalqi military officers vastly outnumbered
Parchami officers and feared the latter might inform Daoud of
this, raising his suspicion that a coup was imminent. Although
plans for a coup had long been discussed, according to a
statement by Hafizullah Amin, the April 1978 coup was implemented
about two years ahead of time.
The April 19, 1978, funeral for Mir Akbar Khyber, a prominent
Parchami ideologue who had been murdered, served as a rallying
point for Afghan communists. An estimated 10,000 to 30,000
persons gathered to hear stirring speeches by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Karmal. Shocked by this demonstration of communist unity, Daoud ordered
the arrest of PDPA leaders, but he reacted too slowly. It took
him a week to arrest Taraki, and Amin was merely placed under
house arrest. According to later PDPA writings, Amin sent
complete orders for the coup from his home while it was under
armed guard using his family as messengers. The army had been put
on alert on April 26 because of a presumed "anti-Islamic" coup.
Given Daoud's repressive and suspicious mood, officers known to
have differed with Daoud, even those without PDPA ties or with
only tenuous connections to the communists, moved hastily to
prevent their own downfall.
On April 27, 1978, a coup d'état beginning with troop
movements at the military base at Kabul International Airport,
gained ground slowly over the next twenty-four hours as rebels
battled units loyal to Daoud in and around the capital. Daoud and
most of his family were shot in the Presidential Palace the
following day. Two hundred and thirty-one years of royal and then republican rule by Ahmad Shah and his descendants had ended and the period
of the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had began.Daoud's Republic (July 17, 1973 - April 28, 1978)
April 1978 Coup