Epistemic virtue
The
epistemic virtues, as identified by
virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to the intellectual
virtue or
vice of one's thought life.
Epistemology is the branch of
philosophy concerned with the question "How do we know?" Some epistemic virtues have been identified by
W. Jay Wood, based on research into the
medieval tradition. The list below substantially overlaps with his.
These can be contrasted to the
epistemic vices such as:
- close-mindedness
- curiosity [see below]
- intellectual dishonesty
- dogmatism
- epistemic blindness
- folly
- gullibility
- obtuseness
- self-deception
- superficiality of thought
- superstition
- willful naivete
- wishful thinking
Note that in this context
curiosity bears the medieval connotation of attraction to unwholesome things, in contrast to the positive ''studious" (or perhaps 'inquisitive').
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