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2 Countries with diplomatic relations with the ROC 3 U.S.-Taiwan Relations 4 Relations with other countries 5 Related articles |
International disputes
The political status of the Republic of China on Taiwan is itself controversial and described in political status of Taiwan.
The 1970s saw a switch in diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. In October 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly, expelling the Republic of China and replacing the China seat on the Security Council (and all other UN organs) with the People's Republic of China. It declared "that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations" and thus labeled the Republic of China a renegade authority. Multiple attempts by the Republic of China to rejoin the UN have not made it past committee. Today, all but 27 nations recognize the Republic of China, as the PRC makes breaking ties with the ROC and the recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China the prerequisite to diplomatic relations.
Although the current presidential administration leans toward Taiwan independence it has not formally renounced its jurisdiction over Mainland China (including Tibet). The relationship with Mongolia is more complicated. Until 1945, the ROC claimed jurisdiction over Mongolia, but under Soviet pressure, it recognized Mongolian independence. Shortly thereafter, it repudiated this recognition and continued to claim jurisdiction over Mongolia until recently.
Since the late 1990s, relationship with Mongolia has become a controversial topic. The DPP is attempting to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia, but this move is controversial because it is widely seen as a prelude for renouncing ROC sovereignty over Mainland China thereby declaring Taiwan independence.
On less official terms, Taiwan is involved in a complex dispute for control over the Spratly Islands with mainland China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei; and over the Paracel Islands, occupied by mainland China, but claimed by Vietnam and ROC. ROC claims the Japanese-administered Senkaku-shoto (Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Tai), as does mainland China.
On November 7, 2003, ties were established with Kiribati. However, Taipei did not demand that ties be broken with Beijing and ROC Foreign Minister Eugene Chien said that he would not reject having both sides of the Taiwan strait recognized simultaneously.[1] The PRC also broke precedent by not cutting ties until November 29 and spent the interim lobbying for Kiribati President Anote Tong to reverse his decision. The decision to hold off for weeks was possibly due to the strategic importance of the PRC's satellite tracking base on Kiribati, which had been used for Shenzhou V and thought to have been used to spy on a U.S. missile range in the Marshall Islands.
Countries with diplomatic relations with the ROC
Singapore ended their diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1992, South Korea and Saudi Arabia ended their diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1992, while South Africa switched recognition to the PRC from1998.
U.S.-Taiwan Relations
Relationships between the United States and Taiwan are governed by the Taiwan Relations Act.
In addition Taiwan has been mentioned in the Three Communiques between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
According to the CIA World Factbook,
The U.S. has welcomed and encouraged the cross-Strait dialogue as a process which contributes to a reduction of tension and to an environment conducive to the eventual peaceful resolution of the outstanding differences between the two sides. The United States believes that differences between Taipei and Beijing should be resolved by the people on both sides of the Strait themselves. The U.S. has consistently stated that its abiding interest is that the process be peaceful.This statement is an example of the careful wording that the United States has to undergo in order to avoid possibly disastrous diplomatic gaffes. A clear statement that the United States does not recognize the PRC claim to Taiwan would bring instant diplomatic retaliation from the PRC. A clear statement that the United States does recognize the PRC claim over Taiwan would risk encouraging the PRC to take military action against Taiwan, and would also be politically almost impossible, in view of the sympathy that Taiwan has in the United States. So the United States responds by refusing to be clear on anything.
Fortunately, all of the parties in this issue are not dissatisfied by the current situation, and there is a generally agreement to maintain the "status quo," which includes not being very clear about what the "status quo" really is. Unfortunately, there was some worry that the policy of strategic ambiguity would cause mistaken impressions of people's intentions. Partly to deal with this situation, the policy of the four noes and one without has been developed in which Taiwan has pledged not to take certain actions that would be provocative toward Beijing. In a number of cases, when Taiwan appeared to be moving away from this policy, Washington has asked for and received assurances that this was not the case.
Similar positions on Taiwan are taken by a majority of countries. 27 nations recognize the ROC as the legitimate ruler of China and reject the PRC claims to legitimacy. During the 1990s, Taiwan actively encouraged such recognition through generous grants of foreign aid. In the 2000s, this strategy was abandoned because the PRC could outbid the ROC with foreign aid, and the spending of large sums of money to buy recognition became quite unpopular on Taiwan.
In the 2000s, Taiwan's diplomatic strategy appears to have shifted to encourage "democratic solidarity" with major powers such as the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Diplomatic representation in the US:
Official diplomatic relations are currently nonexistent; unofficial commercial and cultural relations with the people of the US are maintained through a private instrumentality, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the US with headquarters in Taipei and field offices in Washington and 12 other US cities. TECRO is technically a private organization, but its staff consists of career diplomats who have temporarily "retired."
Diplomatic representation from the US:
Official diplomatic relations are currently nonexistent; unofficial commercial and cultural relations with the people on Taiwan are maintained through a private corporation, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which has its headquarters in Rosslyn, Virginia (telephone: [1] (703) 525-8474 and FAX: [1] (703) 841-1385), and offices in Taipei at #7 Lane 134, Hsin Yi Road, Section 3, telephone [886] (2) 2709-2000, FAX [886] (2) 2702-7675, and in Kao-hsiung at #2 Chung Cheng 3d Road, telephone [886] (7) 224-0154 through 0157, FAX [886] (7) 223-8237, and the American Trade Center at Room 3207 International Trade Building, Taipei World Trade Center, 333 Keelung Road Section 1, Taipei 10548, telephone [886] (2) 2720-1550, FAX [886] (2) 2757-7162.
Technically, the AIT is a private organization, but its staff consists of career diplomats from the United States State Department who are formally "on leave" to serve in the AIT. Again, this is an example of the type of compromise that the United States has to go through in order to prevent diplomatic problems.
While maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC, many countries still maintain unofficial 'trade missions' or 'representative offices' in Taipei, to deal with commercial and consular issues. However, owing to political sensitivities, these countries may often forward visa applications to their nearest embassy or consulate, rather than processing them locally. Similarly, the ROC or 'Chinese Taipei' maintains unofficial 'Taipei Representative Offices' in other countries, such as the UK.
The ROC also has to compete at the Olympic Games and other international sporting events under the name 'Chinese Taipei', with a different flag and anthem, in order to avoid antagonising the PRC.
The dispute over the ROC's status has also affected the island's air links with the outside world, particularly Europe, North America and Australia. For many years, Mandarin Airlines, a subsidiary of the ROC's national airline, China Airlines (CAL) served many international destinations that CAL did not, owing to political sensitivities. However, in 1995 CAL dropped the ROC national colours from its livery, and now flies to international destinations under its own name.
Many countries' national airlines operate services to Taipei using a different name and livery. For example, British Airways does not fly from London to Taipei, but its subsidiary, 'British Asia Airways' did, with Chinese characters on their aircraft's tailfin instead of BA's Union Jack. Australian carrier Qantas has a subsidiary called 'Australia Asia Airways', which flies between Sydney and Taipei.
International dialling codess are assigned by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to its member states and their dependencies. However, as the ROC was not an ITU member state, it had to be allocated the code 886 unoffically, with the ITU listing the code as 'reserved'. The PRC does not recognise the 886 country code, although it does recognise those allocated to Hong Kong and Macau, instead reserving part of its numbering plan for calls to Taiwan.Relations with other countries
Unofficial missions
Sporting events
Air links
Telecommunications