The neutrality of this article is disputed.
The Palestinian Exodus is the name given to the Palestinian refugee flight that took place during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In that flight 520,000 (Israeli estimate) to 1,000,000 (Arab estimate) Palestinian Arabs fled from their homes in what would become the state of Israel to neighbouring countries. Despite international pressure, Israel forebade them to return home and their property was either destroyed or expropriated to Israeli Jews.
Today the original refugees and their descendants amount to some 5.5-6.5 million Palestinians.
The history of the Palestinian Exodus is closely tied to the events of
the war in Palestine that lasted from 1947-1949. One can
safely assume that if there hadn't been a war, there wouldn't
have been a Palestinian Exodus. That wars produce refugees is a well known fact. But few other wars in history have produced such a massive refugee flight of one ethnic group as the Palestine war did. Therefore other factors must have played a role forming it. But what they are and how they affected it is still today a very debated issue.
From the start of the Zionist endeavour in Palestine, the Jews wanted
to create a Jewish state in Palestine. A state that should be built on
Jewish traditions and culture. But the land was already populated
mostly with Arabs abiding other religions and customs than the Jewish
ones. Therefore the demographic reality of Palestine, which was
dominated by Arabs, was a great hinderance for the establishment of a
Jewish state and had to be changed.
The most important means to achieve that change was through aliya,
Jewish immigration to the land of Israel. But the Palestinian Arab
population had a much higher birth rate than the Jewish
counterpart. Even with Jewish immigration, the Arab population growth
firmly outpaced the Jewish one and no part of Palestine, with the
exception of Tel Aviv and its surroundings, would be able to
produce a Jewish majority. To make matters worse, immigration was
restricted by both the Ottoman Turks and the British and
relatively few diaspora Jews actually wished to immigrate to
Palestine, most preferring to move to North America.
An apartheid state, akin to the one in South Africa, was out of
the question for most Zionists as they wanted an egalitarian state.
The only viable solution seemed to be to partition Palestine. But
however the land was partitioned, the part belonging to the Jews would
contain an Arab majority or atleast a very large Arab minorty. For the
Zionist leadership transfer of a large Arab population was the only
solution.
The idea of transfer was not, in 1947-1949, when it actually happened,
a new one. In June 12, 1895 Theodore Herzl wrote in his
diary:
History
Transfer thinking
To the Zionists it was of uttermost importance that the transfer plans
would not become known to the world as that would lower the worlds
support for the Zionists.
Moshe Sharett, director of the Jewish Agency's Political
Department, declared:
In 1937 the Peel Commission gave extra fuel to the transfer
thinking. It recommended that Britain should withdraw from Palestine
and that the land should be partitioned between Jews and Arabs. It
also recommended that 225,000 Arabs should be transferred out of the
proposed Jewish state. This was a huge step forward for the
Zionists. Until then, transfer hadn't been discussed as an option with
outsiders but now "the Royal Commission" came to the same solution to
the problem as the Zionists had. David Ben-Gurion didn't spare the
supleratives when he wrote in his diary:
From the previously mentioned prevalent transfer thinking and from the
actual expulsions that took place in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, some
historians have drawn the conclusion that the Palestinian Exodus was a
preplanned act. Even despite the fact that no central expulsion orders
have been found in the archives. They mean that there was a
omnipresent understanding during the war that as many Palestinian
Arabs as possible had to be transferred outside of the Jewish state,
and that that understanding stood behind many of the expulsions that
the commanders on the field carried out and the depopulations that
occurred.
Other historians are sceptical to that conclusion. They press the
point that no central directive has surfaced from the archives. And certainly, if such an omnipotent understanding had existed,
it would have left a mark in the vast amounts of documentation the
Zionist leadership produced at the time.
The supporters of the master plan theory argue that the
missing central directives haven't been found because either it was
deliberately omitted or the understanding of the significance of
explusion was so widespread that no directive was necessary. They
claim that the Zionist leadership in general and Ben-Gurion
in particular were very aware how histiography worked. What would be
written about the war and in which light Israel would be presented was so
important that it was worth making an intentional effort to hide those
of their actions that might seem reprehensible.
Additionally, some historians have interpreted clauses from Plan Dalet as the central directive, i.e. the master plan. Specifically the section instructing commanders to destroy and depopulate villages that contained a hostile and/or difficult to control population.
During these months the climate in Palestine began to get
hot. Hostilities between Jews and Arabs increased and general
lawlessness spread as the British declared to end their mandate in May
1948. War was seemingly inevitable. Middle and upper-class families
from urban areas withdrew to settle in neighbouring countries such as
Transjordan and Egypt. Perhaps as many as 75,000 left in those
months. There was also cases of outright explusions such as in
Qisarya where roughly 1000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted in
February. Irgun and Lehhi played an important role in
terrorizing the Palestinian population.
Most of the refugees from this period probably thought that they soon
would return, just as they had done after the Great Arab Uprising
1936-1939.
This first flight contributed to demoralize the Palestinians and left
them virtually without any leadership.
The fighting in these months was concentrated to the Jerusalem-Tel
Aviv area. It is logical that it was therefore also in this area that
most depopulations took place. The notorious Deir Yassin massacre
in early April, and the exaggerated rumours that followed it, helped
spread fear and panic among the Palestinians.
On May 14, 1948, when Israel's independence was declared, there
were already 250,000 refugees on the road.
The largest single expulsion of the war began in Lydda and
Ramla July 14, in which 60,000 inhabitants were forcibly
expelled on the orders of Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin
wrote in his diary:
This period of the exodus was characterized by Israeli military
accomplishments which was met with resistance from the Palestinians to
be made refugees. The Israeli military activities limited itself to
the Galilee and the sparseley populated Negev desert. It was
clear to the villages in the Galilee, that if they left, return was
far from imminent. Therefore far fewer villages was spontaneously
depopulated than previously. Most of it was due to clear, direct
cause, including brutal expulsion and deliberate harassment. About
half a dozen massacres was committed in the Galilee by the IDF
during this stage of the war.
Operation Hiram, which was the Israeli military operation that
conquered the upper Galilee, is one of the examples in which a direct
expulsion order was given to the commanders:
From Israeli official sources it has long been claimed that the
refugee flight was in large part instigated by Arab leaders. For
example, Yosef Weitz wrote in October 1948:
However, this view has always been rejected by Palestinian writers and
is not consistent with modern research on the war. In the 1980s when
the Israeli archives about the war opened to researchers, the Israeli
New Historians began to question this view. For example,
concerning the alleged evacuation order, or orders, issued by Arab
leaders, Benny Morris wrote:
It should be pointed out that the question has to real significance in
international law. The resolutions that has been passed, urging for
the Palestinains to be allowed to return, does not differentiate
between those who left on their own initiative and those who left for
other reasons.
The UN was from the very beginning involved in the conflict. In the autumn of 1948 the refugee problem was a fact and how it should be settled was discussed. Count Folke Bernadotte said on September 16:
The refugees came from all parts of today's Israel. Most came from the
Jerusalem, al-Ramla, Jaffa and Tulkarm districs which were the most
densely populated. In those districts, virtually all villages were
depopulated and the towns with mixed populations cleansed from
Arabs. In the Galilee, which didn't see heavy fighting before the
end of the war, many villages remained intact even though every
village and town that was occupied there (with the exception of
Nazareth) was evicted. In total, 85% of the Palestinians living
inside Israels borders were evicted.
Alleged "Master Plan"
First stage of the flight, December 1947 - March 1948
Second stage of the flight, April 1948 - June 1948
Third stage of the flight, July 1948
Additionally, widespread looting and several cases of rape took place
during the evacuation. In total, 300,000 Palestinians became refugees
in this stage.Fourth stage of the flight, October 1948 - November 1948
Between 1-200,000 Palestinians left in this stage most going to
Lebanon.Arab leaders endorsing refugee flight
It has been claimed that during the period preceeding the 1948 war and
particularly during the invasion of Arab powers into Palestine, the
Arab High Command called for the Palestinian population to leave their
homes. This view has long been the accepted narrative in the Israeli
government discourse and, until the 1980s, in most books written from
a Zionist viewpoint.
In "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", Morris also
notes Haganah intelligence reports from May 5-6 referring to a
Jordanian campaign calling for the Palestinians to stay put and for
those who left to return. Other documents describe muftis urging
their populations to hold their ground and even threatening those who
leave with punishments.Contemporary mediation
UN Resolution 194 which was passed on December 11 1948 and reaffirmed every year since, was the first resolution that called for Israel to let the refugees return:Refugee sources
| District | Depopulated towns & villages | Refugees |
|---|---|---|
| Acre | 30 | 47,038 |
| Ramleh | 64 | 97,405 |
| Baysan | 31 | 19,602 |
| Beersheba | 88 | 90,507 |
| Gaza | 46 | 79,947 |
| Haifa | 59 | 121,196 |
| Hebron | 16 | 22,991 |
| Jaffa | 25 | 123,227 |
| Jerusalem | 39 | 97,950 |
| Jenin | 6 | 4,005 |
| Nazareth | 5 | 8,756 |
| Safad | 78 | 52,248 |
| Tiberias | 26 | 28,872 |
| Tulkarm | 18 | 11,333 |
| Total | 531 | 805,067 |
Source: http://www.gcmhp.net/File_files/Refugees.html
Note: Seemingly exact numbers of refugees are given in the source, but no exact numberss are actually known and for the above values, only 1-2 digits are significant.
Most refugees did not leave Palestine immediately when their homes
were captured by Israel. Instead they left for neighbouring parts of
the land until those parts to were conquered by Israel. Because they
were walking their options was limited.
The West Bank absorbed 38% of the refugees, the Gaza 26% and
Lebanon 14%. The remaining 22% was divided between Egypt,
Iraq, Syria and Transjordan proper. A minor portion, the
upper and middle-class refugees, that fled in the first stage ended up
further away from Palestine because they could afford real
transportation.
Refugee destinations
| Destination | Number of refugees | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| West Bank | 375,200 | 38,23% |
| Gaza Strip | 244,400 | 26,80% |
| Jordan | 94,000 | 10,22% |
| Lebanon | 131,600 | 14,53% |
| Syria | 94,000 | 10,22% |
| Iraq | 3,000 | 0,18% |
| Total | 924,200 | 100,00% |
Source: " class="external">http://www.gcmhp.net/File_files/Refugees.html
In 1950, The Absentee Property Law was passed in Israel. It was
the law that made it domestically legal in Israel to confiscate the
property and land that the departed Palestinians had left behind them,
so called "absentees". Even Arabs who never left Israel, and received
citizenship after the war, but stayed for a few days in a nearby
village had their property confiscated. About 32,000 Palestinians became "present absentees" - persons that were present at the time but considered absent.
How much of Israel's territory consists of land confiscated with the
Absentee Property Law is uncertain. According to the Israeli
Custodian of Absentee Property, 70% of the territory:
"Absentee" property
The Jewish National Fund's estimate quite a bit higher at 88%:
The absentee property played an enormous role in making Israel a
viable state. In 1954 about one third of Israel's population lived
on absentee property. Of 370 new Jewish settlements established
1948-1953, 350 were on absentee property. As Moshe Dayan put it in
an often quoted speech before students at the Israeli Institute of
Technology in 1969: