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2 District Court 3 Court of Appeals 4 Supreme Court 5 Related Topics 6 External links |
In most cases, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (or CTEA) provided for the extension of existing copyright terms by an additional 20 years from the terms set by the 1976 Copyright Act. The law affected both new and existing works (making it both a prospective extension as well as a retroactive one). Specifically, for works published before January 1, 1976 and still in copyright on October 27, 1998, the term was extended to 95 years. For works authored by individuals on or after January 1, 1976 (including new works), the copyright term was extended to equal the life of the author plus 70 years. In the case of works-for-hire, anonymous or pseudonymous works, the term was set at 95 years from the date of first publication, or 120 years from creation.
The practical result of this was to prevent a number of works, beginning with those published in 1923, from entering the public domain in 1998 and subsequent years, as would have occurred under the previous law. Books, films and other materials which the plaintiffs had been prepared to republish or restore were now unavailable due to copyright restrictions.
The lead petitioner, Eric Eldred, is a noncommercial Internet publisher of public domain texts and derivative works.
Eldred is joined by a group of commercial and non-commercial interests who rely on the public domain for their work. These include Dover Publications, a commercial publisher of paperback books; Petitioner's Luck's Music Library, Inc, and Edwin F. Kalmus & Co., Inc, publishers of orchestral sheet music; and a large number of amici including (but not limited to) the Free Software Foundation, the American Association of Law Libraries, and the College Art Association.
Supporting the law is the U.S. government, represented by the Attorney General (originally Janet Reno, later replaced by John Ashcroft), along with a set of amici including (but not limited to) the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry Association of America, ASCAP and Broadcast Music Incorporated.
The original complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on January 11, 1999. The plaintiffs' argument was threefold:
On October 28, 1998, Judge June Green issued a brief opinion rejecting all three of the petitioners' arguments. On the first count, she wrote that Congress had the power to extend terms as it wished, as long as the terms themselves were of limited durations. On the second count, she rejected the notion of First Amendment scrutiny in copyright cases, based on her interpretation of Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, an earlier Supreme Court decision. On the third count, she rejected the notion that public trust doctrine was applicable to copyright law.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision of the District Court to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, filing their initial brief on May 22, 2000 and arguing the case on October 5 of the same year in front of a three-judge panel. Arguments were similar to those made in the Court of Appeals, except for those regarding the public interest doctrine, which were not included in the appeal.
Instead, the plaintiffs extended their argument on the Copyright clause to note that the clause requires Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts", and argued that retroactive extensions do not directly serve this purpose in the standard quid pro quo previously required by the courts.
The case was decided February 16, 2001. The Appeals Court upheld the decision of the District Court in a 2 to 1 opinion. In a forceful dissent, Judge David Sentelle agreed with the plaintiffs that CTEA was indeed unconstitutional based on the "limited Times" requirement. Supreme Court precedent, he argued, held that one must be able to discern an "outer limit" to a limited power; in the case of retrospective copyright extensions, Congress could continue to extend copyright terms indefinitely through a set of limited extensions, thus rendering the "limited Times" requirement meaningless.
Following this ruling, plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing en banc (in front of the full panel of nine judges). This petition was rejected 7 to 2, with Judges Sentelle and David Tatel dissenting.
On October 11, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. On February 19, 2002, the Court granted Certiorari, agreeing to hear the case.
Oral arguments were presented on October 9, 2002. Lead counsel for the plaintiff was Lawrence Lessig; the government's case was argued by Solicitor General Theodore Olson.
Lessig refocused the Plaintiffs' brief to emphasize the Copyright clause restriction, as well as the First Amendment argument from the Appeals case. The decision to emphasize the Copyright clause argument was based on both the minority opinion of Judge Sentelle in the appeals court, and on several recent decisions authored by Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist: United States vs. Lopez and United States vs. Morrison.
In both of those decisions, Rehnquist, along with four of the Court's more conservative justices, held Congressional legislation unconstitutional, because said legislation exceeded the limits of the Constitution's Commerce clause. This profound reversal of precedent, Lessig argued, could not be limited to only one of the enumerated powers. If the court felt that it had the power to review legislation under the Commerce clause, Lessig argued, then the Copyright clause deserved similar treatment, or at very least a "principled reason" must be stated for according such treatment to only one of the enumerated powers.
On January 15, 2003, the Court held the CTEA constitutional by a 7-2 decision. The majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, relied heavily on the 1790, 1831, 1909, and 1976 Copyright Acts as precedent for retroactive extensions. The Supreme Court declined to address Lessig's contention that Lopez and Morrison offered precedent for enforcing the Copyright clause, and instead reiterated the lower Court's reasoning that a retroactive term extension can satisfy the "limited times" provision in the Copyright Clause as long as the extension itself is limited instead of perpetual. Furthermore, the Court refused to apply proportionality standards of the Fourteenth Amendment and free speech concepts in the First Amendment to limit Congress's ability to confer copyrights for limited terms.
Dissenting opinions were penned by Justices Stevens and Breyer. Lessig expressed surprise that no decisions were authored by Justice Rehnquist, or any of the other four justices who supported the decision in Lopez or Morrison.
Background
District Court
In response, the government argued that Congress does indeed have the latitude to retroactively extend terms, so long as the individual extensions are also for "limited Times", as required by the Constitution. As an argument for this position, they referred to the 1790 Copyright Act, the first Federal copyright legislation, which applied Federal protection to existing works. Furthermore, they argued, neither the First Amendment nor public trust doctrine are applicable to copyright cases.Court of Appeals
Supreme Court
Related Topics
External links